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DOES DEFERRED TAX MEDIATE THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TAX PLANNING AND EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT?
a. Wafaa Salah1
a. Lecturer of Accounting, Accounting Department, Faculty of Business Administration, Economics & Political
Sciences, The British University in Egypt, Cairo, Egypt.

Abstract
The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of deferred tax disclosed under the Egyptian Accounting
Standard No. 24, income taxes and tax planning on earnings management. In addition, to investigate the role of net
deferred tax liabilities as a mediator between tax planning and earnings management. This study employs a sample
of 127 firms listed on the Egyptian stock exchange covering the period 2011 to 2017 ending up with 889
observations. Stratified simple random sampling technique was used to select the sample. Path analysis is employed
to examine the framework of the study and analyses the indirect effect of tax planning on earnings management. In
addition, Ordinary Least Square Regression is employed to calculate discretionary accrual, which is used as a proxy
to earnings management. The results suggest that tax planning does not have a significant direct effect on earnings
management. However, it has a significant indirect effect on earnings management through net deferred tax
liabilities, which in turn has a significant direct effect on earnings management. Findings of this paper may be of
interest to financial analysts and standard setters, as they highlight how tax planning and deferred tax liabilities
affect the quality of accounting information.
Keywords: discretionary accrual, tax reform, accounting quality, deferred tax liabilities

مستخلص البحث
"ضرائب الدخل" والتخطيط24 يهدف البحث إلى التحقق فيما إذا كانت الضرائب المؤجلة وفقا لمعيار المحاسبة المصرية رقم
 التحقق من دور صافي التزامات الضرائب المؤجلة،  باإلضافة إلى ذلك.الضريبي يمكن أن يستخدما كادوات إلدارة األرباح
 شركة مدرجة في البورصة المصرية127  استخدمت هذه الدراسة عينة من.كوسيط بين التخطيط الضريبي وإدارة األرباح
 و قد تم استخدام أسلوب تحليل المسارات فى فحص إطار. مالحظة889  و التى نتج عنها2018  إلى2012 تغطي الفترة من
 كما تم استخدام أسلوب االنحدار المتعدد لقياس.الدراسة وتحليل التأثير غير المباشر للتخطيط الضريبي على إدارة األرباح
 تشير النتائج إلى أن التخطيط الضريبي ليس له تأثير مباشر على إدارة.االستحقاقات غير العادية و التى تمثل إدارة األرباح
تأثيرا غير مباشر على إدارة األرباح من خالل صافي التزامات الضرائب المؤجلة و التى لها أيضا
 فإن له،  ومع ذلك.األرباح
ً
 ألنها توضح كيفية تأثير، قد تكون نتائج هذه الدراسة محل اهتمام المحللين الماليين والمشرعيين.تأثير مباشر على إدارة األرباح
. التخطيط الضريبي والتزامات الضرائب المؤجلة على جودة المعلومات المحاسبية
 التزامات الضرائب،  التخطيط الضريبى،  جودة المعلومات، إدارة األرباح:الكلمات الرئيسية
المؤجلة
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1. Introduction
Corporate taxation is considered one of the main sources of the Egyptian Government’s revenue.
The tax rate average is 21.92 percent from 2006 to 2018, reaching a high of 25 percent in 2012
and a low of 20 percent in 2007. The aim of tax reporting is quite different from financial
reporting. While the aim of taxation is to collect taxes as high as possible to ensure continuous
revenue for the government budget, the aim of financial reporting is to provide insight into the
firm underlying economic position to its present and potential users for making rational
decisions(Gaynor, Kelton, Mercer, Yohn, & Theory, 2016). Hence, managers are allowed by
accounting standards to use accruals to enhance resource allocation and reflect true economic
situation. This results in book-tax differences, which is the difference between accounting
income to taxable income. According to Habanec and Bohušová (2017), book‑ tax differences
may be caused by capital market irregularity, earnings management, or income tax accounting.
Similarly, Puspitasari and Muktiyanto (2018) state that taxation is considered one of the
motivators for earnings management; affecting income to reduce tax expenses in the following
year.
Some managers misuse the flexibility provided by accounting standards to manipulate tax for
accomplishing their personal earnings objectives which might affect the country welfare (Lee,
Vetter, Williams, & Research, 2015; Mulyadi, Anwar, & Sciences, 2015). The accounting
scandals like Enron, WorldCom showed that managers are able to manipulate earnings in the
way they plan. This requires from the researchers around the world to conduct more
investigation with respect to proxies of earnings management. Earnings management is defined
in several different ways. One of the popular definitions was given by Healy and Wahlen (1999):
"Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in
structuring transaction to alter reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on
reported accounting numbers". Over time, the definition includes wider activities. For instance,
earnings management is defined by Walker and Research (2013) as “The use of managerial
discretion over accounting choices, earnings reporting choices, and real economic decisions to
influence how underlying economic events are reflected in one or more measures of earnings”.
According to Mulyadi et al. (2015), firms with higher growth opportunities have a higher
motivation to manipulate earnings.
Although the research in earnings management has increased since 2005, however, using
deferred tax and tax planning(TP) as predictors to earnings management is a new stream of
research(Wang, Butterfield, & Campbell, 2016). Managers may use deferred tax or TP to affect
book income without affecting taxable income and hence recognize deferred tax. The Egyptian
Accounting standard (EAS) No. 24 which is compatible with the International Accounting
Standards(IAS) 12 required more disclosures from firms regarding deferred tax as the evidence
supporting the recognition and derecognition of the deferred tax to enable financial statement
users to have adequate information regarding the deferred tax. However, firms do not provide
enough disclosure, which open doors for manipulation(Elassal, 2012).
A growing body of literature finds that book-tax differences were increasing throughout the
late 1990s and attribute this to managers manipulating both of them to achieve high reported
book income and low reported taxable income. One of the instruments used to manipulate
earnings is TP(Desai & Dharmapala, 2009; Mikova, 2014). The main objective is to reduce the
tax paid to the government to report better cash flow to investors. Phillips, Pincus, and Rego

(2003) claim that managers can manipulate book income without affecting book-tax differences
by engaging in activities that generate permanent book-tax differences or affecting the operating
cash flow and hence it is difficult to detect earnings manipulation through deferred tax. This
means that deferred tax cannot grasp all earnings manipulation activities and may be considered
as a mean for TP. Moreover, Puspitasari and Muktiyanto (2018) find that there is a positive
relationship between earnings management and the book-tax differences in the banking industry.
As a result, investigating the relationship between deferred tax, TP and earnings management is
considered an important empirical question.
Hence, the objective of this study is to investigate whether TP and net deferred tax liabilities
(NDTL) are reasonable predictors for earnings management in Egypt controlling for firm size,
liquidity, financial leverage, and performance. In addition, to investigate the role of NDTL as a
mediator between TP and earnings management. This paper is built on the article of Ifada and
Wulandari (2015) which assumes that deferred taxes and TP are significantly affecting earnings
management. However, this study focuses on firms listed on the Egyptian stock market and
investigates the mediating effect of NDTL.
This study contributes to the literature in three folds. First, a growing body of literature
investigated the effect of TP and deferred tax on earnings management. These studies have
mostly taken place in the U.S., China, Indonesia and Europe(Brummer, 2017). However, few
studies investigate this issue in Egypt. Moreover, to the researcher knowledge, no empirical
study used quantitative data to investigate the association between deferred taxes, TP and
earnings management practices in Egypt. Thus, the results of this study contribute to the earnings
management and taxation literature and practice in Egypt by providing evidence that TP and
deferred tax are powerful predictors for tax-induced earnings management. Second, this study
sheds light on the characteristics of firms that can mediate the relationship between TP and
earnings management. Third, contradicting results of previous studies motivates to re-investigate
the impact of NDTL and TP on earnings management practices. Therefore, this study adds to the
comprehension of tax management in firms.
The results of this study find that TP does not affect directly earnings management. However,
it has an indirect statistically significant effect on earnings management through NDTL, which in
turn has a significant direct effect on earnings management. The results of this study are
consistent with the incremental usefulness of TP and deferred tax as motivators to earnings
management. These results will benefit investors, analysts, researchers, government and tax
authority. It may be considered an alert to the close correlation between deferred tax, TP and
reported earnings, which should be taken into consideration in studying earnings management
behavior, analyses of financial reports and policy setting activities. The remaining of this paper
proceeds as follows: Section 2 covers the relevant literature review and hypothesis development.
Section 3 presents the data, study variables, and research model, followed by Section 4, which
discusses the results, and finally concludes the paper.

2. Literature review
The agency theory is concerned about the conflict of interest between managers (agents) and
shareholders (principals). This theory assumes that the interests of principals and agents differ.
Although the managers are hired to run the business in the interest of shareholders, there is a risk
that they could focus on their own interest and engage in earnings management. The firm’s
managers try to minimize tax to reduce the tax burden which referred to as TP(Noviana Mulyani
& Dewi, 2018). According to Rehman (2017), the agency theory may cause a conflict of interest
between the agent and the principal that may affect the quality of reported earnings. There is a
strong correlation between TP, earnings management and behavior management which is related
to the agency theory(Puspitasari & Muktiyanto, 2018). Moreover, the positive accounting theory
assumes that managers can act in either efficient way to present the true economic position of the
firm or opportunistic way to maximize his own interest(Walker & Research, 2013). According to
P. M. J. J. o. a. Dechow and economics (1994), earnings manipulation is considered
opportunistic behavior. The positive accounting theory is considered a part of the agency theory
as the positive accounting theory concerned about three agency relationship, namely: (1)
between management and the owners ( 2) between management and creditors, and (3) between
management and the government. Earnings management behavior is based on two theories, the
agency theory, which describes the environment that causes earnings manipulation, and the
positive accounting theory, which focuses on motivations for manipulating earnings.

2.1 Deferred tax and earnings management
The EAS issued by Ministry of Investment in 2006 were prepared according to IAS issued by the
International Accounting Standard Board(IASB) with few differences(Ebrahim, 2014). In
addition, The Minister of Investment decision No. 110 of 2015 on the issuance of the new
Egyptian Accounting Standards are compatible largely with the international accounting
standards. EAS No. 24, which is compatible with IAS 12, defined temporary differences as the
timing differences between pretax financial income and taxable income based on when revenue
or expense are recognized. Temporary differences that cause a future tax deduction creates
deferred tax asset. On the other hand, the temporary differences that cause a future tax liability
create a deferred tax liability. The two main accounts that contribute to these differences are
depreciable tangible assets and intangible assets (Lee et al., 2015). Deferred tax liabilities are
recognized when tax expense is greater than the tax payable. This gap is caused as a result of two
situations: income before tax includes some revenues recognized but not yet recognized in
taxable income or expenses deducted in taxable income that is deferred for accounting purposes
until later periods. Probable deferred tax liability is recognized(Chang, Herbohn, & Tutticci,
2009). Table 1 shows some situations that cause temporary differences.
NDTL is the difference between deferred tax liabilities and deferred tax assets(Warsono,
2017). Bernard, Skinner, and Economics (1996) state that a higher difference between firms
reported pre-tax financial income and taxable income shows the "red flag" for users of financial
statements. This means that users of financial statements need to be careful in using such
financial statements in its decision-making. Earnings management can take place by increasing
the net deferred tax liabilities, which may cause higher deferred tax expenses. This is consistent
with the positive accounting theory proposed by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) in which the

deferred tax expense can motivate managers to manipulate earnings for tax saving. Mills and
Newberry (2001) find that privately held firms suffering from financial problems tend to have
greater book-tax differences, which is considered a sign of earnings management. According to
Phillips et al. (2003), managers may have incentives to use deferred tax to increase or decrease
financial income without affecting taxable income. They found that NDTL is a good predictor
for earnings manipulation by controlling the impact of changes in cash flow from operations.
This may occur due to information asymmetry between shareholders. They use the deferred tax
expense, as a proxy for book-tax differences. Deferred tax expense is calculated as the annual
change in total NDTL.
Table 1: Temporary differences situations

Accelerated depreciation is allowed for tax purposes using rates up to 50% annually
for computers and software assets.
Taxpayer is allowed 30% bonus depreciation of some new assets used.
Allowances and provisions are not deductible except if actual write off of bad debts
take place after taking all necessary measures to collect the debt and not before 18
months of its initial date.
Net Operating Losses allowed to be carried forward for up to 5 years.
Source: Ebrahim (2014)
Firm management may use accruals to achieve two reporting purposes, namely to avoid
low profits or avoid losses. Using a sample of Chinese firms, Tang (2005) investigates the power
of book-tax differences in detecting earnings management. He suggested that book-tax
differences can be used as a proxy for earnings manipulation. Moreover, using a sample of
consumer and industrial products firms listed on Bursa, Malaysia, R. Md Noor, N. Mastuki, and
Z. J. M. A. R. Aziz (2007) examine whether deferred tax liabilities is used to prevent earnings
decline or loss. They find that firms use deferred tax liabilities to prevent loss. However, they
were not able to find evidence that firms use deferred tax liabilities to avoid low profits. Deferred
taxes are better than revenue and expense accruals in predicting when earnings management is
used to avoid an earnings decline or subsequent earnings restatements(Badertscher, Phillips,
Pincus, & Rego, 2006).
Financial accounting standards allow managers to use more discretion than tax rules.
Hence, lower taxable income through the creation of deferred tax liabilities may cause a
reduction in the amount of current tax and may be classified as tax avoidance. This may increase
the firm value when using low-risk methods to reduce tax (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Elassal
(2012) investigates the impact of deferred tax assets on earnings management. He finds that
Egyptian firms disclose incomplete information regarding the deferred tax to manage earnings
and meet financial analysts' earnings forecasts. Additionally, Blaylock, Gaertner, and Shevlin
(2015) find that there is a positive relationship between book-tax differences and earnings
management. He claimed that the benefits of higher book-tax conformity are more faithfully
represented financial statements with less earnings management, reduction in both tax shelters
and firm compliance costs. Moreover, Ifada and Wulandari (2015) investigate the use of deferred
tax expense, TP and firm size in managing taxable income instead of financial accounting
income. They found that there that deferred taxes significantly affect earnings management.
However, they found no significant relationship between firm size and TP on earnings
management. Using a sample of 30 Egyptian listed firms, Nabil(2016) find that book-tax

differences significantly affect earnings management and can be used as a model for detecting
earnings manipulation. Additionally, using a sample of 17 firms listed on the Indonesia stock
exchange for the period 2012-2015, Kusumaningrat (2017) investigate the effect of deferred tax
expense, leverage, and size on earnings management. The results reveal that the deferred tax and
size significantly affect earnings management. He claims that large size firms have large
incentives to manipulate earnings compared to small firms to prevent sever increases in earnings
to avoid high taxes. However, leverage has no significant effect on earnings management.
Rathke, Rezende, Antônio, and de Moraes (2017) find that firms reporting negative earnings
have significant high net deferred tax expenses. They claim that deferred tax is a suitable account
for earnings management as the amount is estimated in a subjective manner based on
management’s judgment. This estimation allows for earnings adjustments without immediate
effect on cash flow. Moreover, deferred taxes is the last account to be closed before the net
income is computed which represents the last resort for managers to adjust earnings.
On the contrary side, Schrand and Wong (2003) and Phillips, Pincus, Rego, and Wan
(2004) attempt to identify whether the recognition and measurement of deferred tax asset
account are used to manipulate earnings but their research has led to inconclusive and
contradictory results. Trisnawati and Nugraheni (2015) showed that the deferred tax expense has
no effect on earnings management. Similarly, Widiatmoko and Mayangsari (2016) find that
deferred tax asset has an insignificant effect on earnings management. Using a sample of 84
annually manufacturing Indonesian firm, Noviana Mulyani and Dewi (2018) find that deferred
tax expenses negatively affect earnings management. Moreover, Puspitasari and Muktiyanto
(2018) find that deferred tax liabilities have a lower capability to detect manipulation in earnings
in both the banking and non-banking sector.

2.2 Tax planning
Nowadays, corporations depend on TP strategies as one of the financial planning tools, which
helps to reduce, defer or avoid the tax burden. This takes place by identifying weaknesses and
gaps in the tax laws in the country in which the firm wish to invest in. Osama (2010) viewed
deferred tax as a function of TP. Nabil (2012) defines TP as an ongoing process that does not
depend on a specific time or account treatment. However, it takes into consideration all
administrative decisions known as tax strategies, which is used by firms as a means of predicting
its financial performance. It is important to mention that there is no article under Law No. 91
issued in 2005 related to TP. The legislators were reluctant to develop an article that controls TP.
However, if the tax authority discovered any treatment of TP that prevent taxpayers from paying
taxes, it would not be taken into consideration as stipulated in article number 92(repeated) in law
no. 53 in 2014. The article states “In determining the tax income, the tax effect of any transaction
whose main purpose or one of its main purposes is to avoid or defer tax will be ignored”.
Abdallah (2014) defines TP as a tool used to achieve the maximum benefit from tax laws
and international agreements to reach the lowest tax burden possible in the light of the applicable
laws, which is quite different from tax evasion, which leads to a reduction in the tax burden, but
with illegal methods. Warsono (2017) defines TP as a process of choosing among various tax
election methods which aim to keep tax liabilities as minimum as possible in the current year for
the coming period, but still within the framework of tax regulations. TP is one form of tax
management functions for reducing tax legally. According to Samir (2017), a large number of

legislative amendments, the vagueness of the tax laws, the dispute over their interpretation and
the desire of the creditors to reduce the tax liabilities in a legal manner lead to the increase in TP.
The positive accounting theory and TP literature have confirmed that management has
strong motivations to manipulate earnings using taxes. They manage taxes to maximize
shareholders wealth, reduce the political cost, and increase the firm value which will affect stock
market(Phillips et al., 2003; Tang, 2005; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The managers have the
opportunity to manage book income upward or downward without affecting taxable income. The
higher book-tax gap was attributed to aggressive TP which may be considered a sign of earnings
management(Mikova, 2014; Phillips et al., 2003). Many multinational companies try to reduce
their tax liability by shifting profit through transfer pricing in order to reduce the overall tax
liability for the corporation. For instance, multinational companies as Apple, Cisco, Devon,
Google, Microsoft, Oracle and Pfizer had total profit equal 164 billion dollars, however, through
TP, their tax rate was 12 percent(Mikova, 2014). TP and earnings management are considered
related to each other. Both of them can affect the book income and taxable income. TP try to
increase revenue and decrease costs which affect cash from operating activities. This will result
in an increase of firm profit and hence increase tax. As a result, some managers try to use
earnings management techniques to reduce taxes as much as possible.
Recent studies investigating earnings management via TP find evidence of earnings
manipulation. For instance, Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) find a strong positive relationship
between aggressive tax management and earnings management. They claim that disagreement
between tax rules and financial accounting standards open the door for managers to manipulate
earnings upwards while reducing taxable income in the same accounting period. Previous
research support unified accounting standards for both financial and tax reporting. They claim
that this will reduce the opportunistic behavior of the managers and the tax authority can control
reported earnings(Desai & Dharmapala, 2009; Mikova, 2014). Previous research suggests that
financial income may be used as a basis for taxation as managers can manipulate financial
income without affecting taxable income(Manzon Jr & Plesko, 2001; Phillips et al., 2003). Using
a sample of 600 U.S corporations, Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2011) find that 31 percent of
the surveyed firms use TP strategies to manipulate earnings.
On the other hand, The study done by Widiatmoko and Mayangsari (2016) find that TP
has an insignificant positive effect on earnings management. In addition, Noviana Mulyani and
Dewi (2018) find that TP has no effect on earnings management. They claim that TP is used to
regulate and reduce tax obligations for the interest of the firm’s stakeholders and not to violate
the applicable laws. Based on the above literature, the following hypothesis is formulated as
follows.
H1: Tax planning significantly affects earnings management practices.
H2: Net deferred tax liabilities significantly affect earnings management practices.
H3: Net deferred tax liabilities mediate the relationship between tax planning and earnings
management practices.

3. Methodology
This section describes the sample, the study variables, and presents the models used to analyze
how the firm’s TP and NDTL influence its earnings quality.

3.1. Sample and Data Collection
A multi-sector sample of 127 publicly listed firms in the Egyptian stock exchange was used for
analysis. The sample period covers the years 2011 to 2017 for 889 observations. Stratified simple
random sampling was used to select the studied sample. Path analysis was employed in this
study. The financial data was extracted from annual reports which were sourced from Thomson
Reuters Eikon database which is considered an important global database of financial
data(Gallego-Álvarez, Lozano, & Rodríguez-Rosa, 2018). The study adopts three basic sample
selection criteria in order to achieve results for analysis. First of all, firms with missing financial
data (probably as a result of insufficient data) needed for this study for the period are eliminated.
Also, banks and financial institutions are not included. Lastly, a stratified simple random sample
was employed to select the firms used in this study. The final sample yields 889 observations
from different sectors. Table 2 displays the sample breakdown.
Table 2: Economic Sector Breakdown

Economic Sector
Basic Materials
Consumer Cyclicals
Consumer Non-Cyclicals
Industrials
Total

Number of observations
259
231
224
175
889

Percent
29.1
26.0
25.2
19.7
100.0

3.2. Study Variables
3.2.1 Dependent Variable
This study investigates the impact of TP and NDTL on firms' earnings management (EM), the
dependent variable. Several studies on earnings management use accruals as a proxy of earnings
management (Badertscher et al., 2006; P. M. Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Guay, Kothari,
& Watts, 1996; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; R. Md Noor, N. Mastuki, & Z. Aziz, 2007; Puspitasari
& Muktiyanto, 2018). For the current investigation, discretionary accruals are used as a proxy
for earnings management. It is calculated using the modified-Jones model as proposed by P. M.
Dechow et al. (1995). The model for discretionary accruals is estimated by every year and
industry which require at least 15 observations for each industry-year grouping and this
condition was met in the selected sample. The discretionary accruals are calculated by measuring
the non-discretionary accruals as a portion of the total accruals in the Modified Jones Model
using three steps. First, the total accruals were calculated as follow:
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡

(Eq. 1)

Where TACCt is the total accruals in year t; ∆CAt is the change in current assets in year t; ∆Cash
is the change in cash and cash equivalents in year; ∆CLt is the Change in current liabilities in

year t; ∆DCLt is the change in short term debt included in current liabilities in year t; and DEPt is
the depreciation and amortization expense in year t.
Second, the total accruals which are the sum of nondiscretionary accrual and discretionary
accruals are formulated using the modified jones model as shown below:
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡
1
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡 )
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
= 𝛼1
+ 𝛼2
+ 𝛼3
+ 𝜀𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1

(Eq. 2)

Where TACCt is total accruals in year t divided by total assets in year t-1, ∆REVt is revenues in
year t less revenues in year t-1; ∆REC receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1; PPEt is
the Gross property plant and equipment in year t; At-1 is total assets in year t-1; and 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 , and
𝛼3 are Parameters to be estimated, namely alphas which are estimated by means of an ordinary
least squares regression (OLS).
Finally, the discretionary accruals is calculated which is the residual of Eq. 2. The absolute
value of the residual is used as a proxy for earnings management.

3.2.2 Independent Variables
This study uses two independent variables, namely: TP and net deferred tax liabilities. In
addition to four control variables, namely: Firm size, liquidity, leverage and earnings per share.
(1) Tax planning (TP) used in this study is computed using a tax retention rate (TRR) which
evaluates the effectiveness of tax management on firms’ financial reporting. It is suggested that
TRR provides an appropriate measure for TP effectiveness (Wild, Subramanyam, & Halsey,
2005). It is computed by dividing net income for firm i in year t by net income before tax for
firm i in year t-1. The size of the effectiveness of tax management represents the effectiveness of
TP.
(2) Net Deferred Tax Liabilities(NDTL) used in this study arises from the temporary differences
between book and taxable income. It is calculated using the below formula as used in Phillips et
al. (2003):
(DTA𝑡 − 𝐷𝑇𝐿𝑡 )
𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐿𝑡 =
𝐴𝑡−1
Where DTAt is the deferred tax assets in year t, DTLt is the deferred tax liabilities in year t; and
At-1 is total assets in year t-1.
(3) This study uses four control variables. First, firm size(SIZE) measured as the natural log of
firm total assets. Second, leverage(LEV), measure as total debt to total equity. Third,
liquidity(LIQ) measured as current assets divided by current liabilities. Finally, firm
performance(Perf) measured using market-based measures, earnings per share(EPS) which is
calculated by dividing total earnings by outstanding shares.

3.3. Path Analysis Model
To analyze the indirect effects of NDTL on earnings management, a path analysis was
conducted. As shown in Figure 1, the model proposes a mediating impact from NDTL for the
association between TP and EM. In addition, the direct effect of TP on EM is investigated. This
study employs path analysis using IBM Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS) for data
analysis. It is appropriate for analyzing a series of interrelated dependence relationship
simultaneously which helps in testing the fit between the model and the data. It compares
simultaneously regression coefficients, means, and variances(Ghof Ar & Isl Am, 2015).
Figure 1: Proposed Framework

Size

EPS

Leverage

Liquidity

Tax Planning

H2

NDTL

H1

Earnings
Management

e2

e1
H3

4. Results and discussion
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics where the standard deviation values range from 0.01 to
10.31, which show a widespread around the mean. In addition, the mean values of all variables

ranged from -0.0013 to 8.827. However, the analyses of skewness and kurtosis indicate the
normality of the study variables. The values were inside the adequate ranges for normality where
kurtosis range from -2.0 to +2.0 and skewness range from -1.0 to +1.0 for every study
variable(Byrne, 2016). For conducting path analysis, the used maximum likelihood estimators
require multivariate normality of the data or distorted results will be produced.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

EM
NDTL
TP
Size
Liquidity
EPS
Leverage

N

Mean

Statistic

Statistic

889
889
889
889
889
889
889

.0825
.0158
-.0013
8.8274
2.9789
1.3719
1.5434

Std.
Deviation
Statistic
.09218
.02315
.01058
.69816
8.15227
6.15444
10.31726

Skewness
Statistic
.018
-.145
.023
.210
.018
-.002
.207

Kurtosis

Std.
Error
.082
.082
.082
.082
.082
.082
.082

Statistic
-.097
-.041
-.221
-.534
-.163
-.141
-.483

Std.
Error
.164
.164
.164
.164
.164
.164
.164

4.2 Path Analysis
Table 4:Correlation, squared multiple correlation, and Chi Square

EM

NDTL

TP

Size

Liquidity

EPS

Leverage

Squared
Multiple
Correlations
.110

1
EM
-.205** 1
NDTL
*
*
-.077
-.077
1
TP
**
**
**
-.126
.185
.103
1
Size
**
**
**
Liquidity -.038
-.131
.373
-.293
1
*
**
**
**
EPS
-.011
.084
.450
.217
.166
1
**
**
**
**
**
Leverage .001
.104
-.284
.350
-.572
.218
1
Chi-square = .061 , Degrees of freedom = 1, Probability level = .806
*, ** Indicate signiﬁcance correlation at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).and 0.05 level, respectively.

Before using path analysis, the correlation between variables in the model was tested. Table 4
shows the correlation analysis between earnings management and the predictors. A signiﬁcant
correlations between EM and both NDTL and TP is shown, with the strongest correlation being

between EM and NDTL. The correlations between NDTL and all study variables were
signiﬁcant. Similarly, a significant correlation between TP and all study variables is shown. The
Chi-square tests displayed in table 4 reveals that null the hypothesis cannot be rejected. This
implies that the proposed model fits the data as well as the saturated model. All study variables
when analyzed simultaneously, predicted 11% of firm EM.
Table 5: Path Analysis Results

Regression
Coefficients
TP → NDTL
TP → EM

Estimate
-.270**
-.646

Model Fit
Index
CMIN/DF#
RMSE#

Default
Model
.061
.000

NDTL→ EM
Liquidity→ EM

-.406**
-.001

CFI#
NFI#

1.000
1.000

Leverage→ EM

.000

RFI#

0.999

Acceptable Level
Less than 5
Less than 0.05 indicate a close
fit of the model
Greater than 0.95
Greater than 0.9.

Close to 1 indicate a very good
fit
SIZE → EM
-.019**
IFI#
1.001
Close to 1 indicate a very good
fit
EPS →EM
.001*
TLI#
1.019
TLI greater than 0.95
*, ** Indicate signiﬁcance correlation at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).and 0.01 level, respectively.
#Source: Holmes-Smith, Coote, and Cunningham (2006)

Table 5 presents the model fit index which assesses the overall proposed model ﬁt. The
Normed Fit Index (NFI), the ratio between Chi-squared test (χ2) and degrees of freedom (df)
(CMIN/DF), the Relative Fit Index (RFI), the Incremental Fit Indexes which are based on
predicting the comparison of the proposed model with the null model, in which one general
factor is estimated to satisfy all the measured variables(IFI), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the
Tucker-Lewis Fit Index (TLI), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) were
drawn as illustrated in table 5. The model indices were found to be within their acceptable level
as such CMIN/DF= 0.061, RMSEA= 0.000 CFI= 1, NFI= 1, RFI= 0.999, IFI =1.001 and TLI=
1.019. Thus, suggesting that path analysis adequately fit the data. Therefore, the investigation
could proceed to test the hypothesized relationships.
Table 5 presents the unstandardized regression coefficients as well as the goodness of fit indices.
The unstandardized regression coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) methods.
ML attempts to maximize the likelihood that the estimated values of the variables are correct. It
was suggested that both TP and NDTL significantly affect EM measured by non-discretionary
accruals (H1 and H2). In addition, NDTL mediates the relationship between TP and EM (H3).
The results in table 5 do not support H1. That is, the results show an insignificant relationship
between TP and EM (p>0.05). A possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that firms use TP to
regulate tax burden without violating the law. The results of this study are in line with the results
of Widiatmoko and Mayangsari (2016) and Noviana Mulyani and Dewi (2018) who find that TP
has an insignificant effect on earnings management. They claim that TP is used to regulate and
reduce tax obligations for the interest of the firm’s stakeholders and not to violate the applicable

laws. However, the results of this study are inconsistent with the study conducted by Frank et al.
(2009) who claim that disagreement between tax rules and financial accounting standards open
the door for managers to manipulate earnings upwards while reducing taxable income in the
same accounting period.
On the other hand, the relationship between NDTL and EM is statistically significant
(p<0.05) which support H2. Differences in accounting income under EAS and tax law motivate
management to manipulate earnings. This highlights the importance of applying an adequate
monitoring system on deferred tax and the disclosure requirement. The result is in line with the
results of several studies such as Phillips et al. (2003), Blaylock et al. (2015), and Nabil(2016)
who support the argument that NDTL may be considered as a motivator to earning management
to reduce tax shelter and avoid losses. This is consistent with both agency theory and positive
accounting theory. However, the results are in contradiction with the empirical findings of
Trisnawati and Nugraheni (2015) and Widiatmoko and Mayangsari (2016) who showed that the
deferred tax expense has an insignificant effect on earnings management.
Table 6: Effect coefficients for the path model

Variables
Direct Effect
Indirect Effect
TP
---> NDTL
-.270**
NDTL ---> EM
-.406**
TP
---> EM
-.646
.109**
SIZE
---> EM
-.019**
Leverage ---> EM
.000
Liquidity ---> EM
-.001
EPS
---> EM
.001
** Indicate signiﬁcance correlation at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Total
-.270**
-.406**
-.536
-.019**
.000
-.001
.001

Table 6 displays the mediating analysis using direct and indirect effect. It presents the
direct and indirect effect of TP on EM. The results show that TP significantly influences EM
through a mediator NDTL, where the indirect effect of TP on EM is significant at the 0.01 level,
i.e., the increase in the value of TP by one unit leads to an increase in EM by 0.109 through the
mediator NDTL. Moreover, both the direct and total effect of TP on EM is statistically
insignificant which indicates the important role that NDTL plays in earnings manipulation. This
result supports H3, which suggest that NDTL mediates the relationship between TP and EM.
Moreover, the direct effect of NDTL on EM is statistically significant where the increase in the
value of NDTL by one unit affect EM by 0.406. Similarly, the direct effect of firm size on EM is
statistically significant where the increase in the value of NDTL by one unit affect EM by 0.406.
This shows that the EAS 24 that regulates the firm’s deferred tax does not prevent earnings
management through TP and more disclosure may be required by the Egyptian firms.

5. Conclusion
This study analyses the context of the Egyptian listed firm to investigate whether TP and NDTL
are used to manipulate earnings. In addition, the mediating role of NDTL between TP and EM
was investigated. The results bring evidence that publicly listed firms minimize tax payments
through TP using NDTL to manipulate earnings. However, the results do not support that TP has
a direct effect on EM. The study results provide an alert to the tax authority, auditors and
stakeholders due to the close correlation between NDTL, TP, and reported earnings which may
be taken into consideration in their analysis and policy advising activities. This study contributes
to EM literature and provides new evidence about variables that may induce earnings
management practices of Egyptian listed firms.
The results support agency and positive accounting theory in which managers may use earnings
management practices to affect reported earnings through NDTL to recognize income or expense
to shift the earnings to avoid taxes.
Some of the limitations of this study should be mentioned. First, the study excluded banks and
financial institutions. Future studies may investigate these economic sectors. Second, only one
mediator was studied. Future studies may involve other mediators that can affect the relationship
between TP and earnings management. Third, only one measure for earnings management was
used. Future studies may incorporate more measures as real based earnings management.
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